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HUMAN RESEARCH PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT 
This document is the Human Research Program Requirements Document. The 
purpose of this document is to define, document, and allocate HRP 
requirements. The need to produce a Program Requirements Document (PRD) is 
established in HRP-47051A, Human Research Program – Program Plan, and is 
under configuration management control of the Human Research Program 
Control Board (HRPCB). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PURPOSE 
This document defines, documents, and allocates the Human Research Program 
(HRP) requirements to the HRP Program Elements. It also establishes the flow of 
requirements from the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate 
(HEOMD) and the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) down 
to the various HRP Program Elements to ensure that human research and 
technology countermeasure investments support the delivery of 
countermeasures and technologies that satisfy HEOMD’s and OCHMO’s 
exploration mission requirements. 
1.2 SCOPE 
Requirements driving HRP work and deliverables are derived from the 
exploration architecture as well as Agency standards regarding the maintenance 
of human health and performance. Agency human health and performance 
standards will define acceptable risk for each type and duration of exploration 
mission. It is critical to have the best available scientific and clinical evidence in 
setting and validating these standards. In addition, it is imperative that the best 
available evidence on preventing and mitigating human health and performance 
risks is incorporated into exploration mission and vehicle designs. These 
elements form the basis of the HRP research and technology development 
requirements and highlight the importance of HRP investments in enabling 
NASA’s exploration missions. 
HRP requirements are derived from the following documents: 
• ESMD-EARD-08.07 Rev. D, Exploration Architecture Requirements 
Document;  
• NP-2007-07-474-HQ, Section 4.4, ESMD Implementation Plan, pages 
12-13;  
• NASA-STD-3001, NASA Space Flight Human System Standard, 
Volume 1: Crew Health; and  
• NASA-STD-3001, NASA Space Flight Human System Standard, and 
Volume 2: Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health.  
This PRD defines the requirements of the HRP which is composed of the 
following major Program Elements:  
1. Behavioral Health & Performance (BHP),  
2. Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC),  
3. Human Health Countermeasures (HHC),  
4. ISS Medical Project (ISSMP),  
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5. Space Human Factors & Habitability (SHFH), and  
6. Space Radiation (SR).  
The requirements are further subdivided into the following three categories:   
• Human system standards (section 4), 
• Human health and performance risks (section 5), and 
• Provisions of enabling capabilities (section 6). 
HRP requirements, as defined in this document, are allocated to the Program 
Office and its Program Elements. Where appropriate, the Program Elements 
further allocate requirements to their research and technology development 
projects. These allocations are documented in the Element/Project plans.  
Project plans describe specific endpoint deliverables that are linked to Project 
requirements. 
1.3 CHANGE AUTHORITY 
This document is under Configuration Management control of the Human 
Research Program Control Board (HRPCB). Changes to this document will result 
in the issuance of change pages or a full re-issue of the document. A review of 
the PRD will be performed and changes made as necessary to maintain 
consistency with the evolving HEOMD strategies, goals, and objectives. 
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2. DOCUMENTS 
2.1 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
The following documents of the specified revision or the latest revision if not 
identified, are applicable to the extent specified herein. Inclusion of applicable 
documents herein does not in any way imply any order of precedence. 
 
Table 1 – Applicable Documents 
Document No. Revision Date Document Title 
NASA-STD-3001 
Vol. 1 
March 2007 NASA Space Flight Human System 
Standards, Volume 1: Crew Health 
NASA-STD-3001 
Vol. 2 
February 2011 NASA Space Flight Human System 
Standards, Volume 2: Human Factors, 
Habitability and Environmental Health  
NASA/SP-2010-
3407 
January 2010 Human Integration Design Handbook 
HRP-47051A April 2009 Human Research Program – Program Plan 
NM 7120-81 September, 
2009 
NASA Space Flight Program and Project 
Management Requirements 
NPD 1000.0A August 2008 NASA Governance and Strategic 
Management Handbook 
NPD 8500.1B December 2007 NASA Environmental Management 
NPD 8910.1B October, 2009 Care and Use of Animals 
NPR 1080.1A May, 2008 Requirements for the Conduct of NASA 
Research & Technology (R&T) 
NPR 2190.1 April 2003 NASA Export Control Program - Revalidated 
w/changes February 1, 2007 
NPR 2810.1A May 2006 Security of Information Technology 
NPR 5800.1E May 2005 Grant and Cooperative Agreement 
Handbook 
NPR 7100.1 March 2003 Protection of Human Research Subjects 
w/Change 1 (07/07/08) 
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Document No. Revision Date Document Title 
NPR 7120.8 February 2008 NASA Research and Technology Program 
and Project Management Requirements 
NPR 8000.4A December 2008 Agency Risk Management Procedural 
Requirements 
NPR 7123.1A March 2007 NASA Systems Engineering Process and 
Requirements w/Change 1 (11/04/09) 
 
2.2 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
The following documents contain supplemental information to guide the user in 
the application of this document. These reference documents may or may not be 
specifically cited within the text of the document. 
 
Table 2 – Reference Documents 
Document No. Document Title 
ESMD-EARD-08.07D Exploration Architecture Requirements Document 
HRP-47053D Human Research Program Science Management Plan 
HRP-47065B Human Research Program Integrated Research Plan 
(electronically available at: 
http://humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/) 
JSC 28330D Space Life Sciences Directorate  Configuration Control 
Management Plan 
NASA/SP-2004-6113 Bioastronautics Roadmap 
 HRP Evidence Base electronically available at: 
http://humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/evidence/ 
NPD 1000.3D The NASA Organization w/Change 9 (June 14, 2010) 
NPD 7100.8E Protection of Human Research Subjects (Revalidated 
with admin. changes 6/14/2007) 
NSPD31 National Security Presidential Directive 31 – The 
Vision for Space Exploration 
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Document No. Document Title 
S.1281 National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Authorization Act of 2005 
 NASA Institutional Review Board Website - 
http://irb.nasa.gov/ 
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3. HRP GOALS 
This section reflects the HRP Goals and Objectives described in HRP Program 
Commitment Agreement and HRP-47051A, Human Research Program – 
Program Plan. 
3.1 THE GOAL OF THE HRP IS TO PROVIDE HUMAN HEALTH AND 
PERFORMANCE COUNTERMEASURES, KNOWLEDGE, 
TECHNOLOGIES, AND TOOLS TO ENABLE SAFE, RELIABLE, AND 
PRODUCTIVE HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION. THE SPECIFIC 
OBJECTIVES OF THE HRP ARE: 
3.1.1 Develop capabilities, necessary countermeasures, and technologies in 
support of human space exploration, focusing on mitigating the highest 
risks to crew health and performance. Enable the definition and 
improvement of human spaceflight medical, environmental and human 
factors standards. 
3.1.2 Develop technologies that serve to reduce medical and environmental 
risks, to reduce human systems resource requirements (mass, volume, 
power, data, etc.), and to ensure effective human-system integration 
across exploration mission systems. 
3.1.3 Ensure maintenance of Agency core competencies necessary to enable 
risk reduction in the following areas: space medicine; physiological and 
behavioral effects of long-duration spaceflight on the human body; space 
environmental effects (including radiation) on human health and 
performance; and space human factors. 
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4. HRP REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO HUMAN SYSTEM STANDARDS  
4.1 THE HUMAN RESEARCH PROGRAM (HRP) SHALL ENABLE THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF NASA’S HEALTH, MEDICAL, 
HUMAN PERFORMANCE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS IN 
TIME FOR EXPLORATION MISSION PLANNING AND DESIGN. 
Rationale: A first step in mitigation of human health and performance risks 
is the establishment of human spaceflight health standards. These 
standards are designed to address acceptable levels of human health and 
performance risks for exploration missions of varying complexity and 
duration. The NASA Chief Health and Medical Officer (CHMO) has 
established an initial set of standards that serves to guide the HRP in the 
expansion of its evidence base regarding human spaceflight health and 
performance risks. HRP sponsors research and technology development 
enabling modification or development of OCHMO maintained standards. 
Several different types of standards have been established by the CHMO 
and documented in NASA-STD-3001, NASA Space Flight Human 
Systems Standards, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2. Specifically, the standards sets are 
listed below.  
• Fitness-for-duty standards for maintaining the physiological and 
behavioral parameters necessary to perform the required tasks; 
• Permissible outcome limits for the changes in health outcomes that are 
potentially affected by long-term exposure to the space environment;  
• Permissible exposure limits for managing risks by controlling human 
exposure; 
• Levels of care standards for guiding medical capabilities needed to 
respond to a medical contingency during exploration missions; and 
• Human factors, habitability, and environmental standards to guide the 
development of spacecraft and systems so as to alleviate human 
health and performance impacts. 
The HRP requirements necessary to ensure the best possible evidence 
base in order to enable the development of standards are included in this 
section: 
4.1.1 The HHC shall perform the research necessary to enable the 
development and validation of the Fitness for Duty Aerobic Capacity 
standard. 
4.1.2 The HHC shall perform the research necessary to enable the 
development and validation of the Fitness for Duty Sensorimotor 
standard. 
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4.1.3 The HHC shall perform the research necessary to enable the 
development and validation of the Fitness for Duty Hematology and 
Immunology standard. 
4.1.4 The HHC shall perform the research necessary to enable the 
development and validation of the Permissible Outcome Limit for 
Nutrition standard. 
4.1.5 The HHC shall perform the research necessary to enable the 
development and validation of the Permissible Outcome Limit for Muscle 
Strength standard. 
4.1.6 The HHC shall perform the research necessary to enable the 
development and validation of the Permissible Outcome Limit for 
Microgravity Induced Bone Mineral Loss Performance standard. 
4.1.7 The HHC shall perform the research and ensure the technology 
availability to ensure the Levels of Care standards in pharmacology can 
be met for each exploration mission. 
4.1.8 The HHC shall perform the research and technology development 
necessary to enable the development of the Extravehicular Activity 
(EVA) sections of NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human Systems 
Standard, Vol.2. 
4.1.9 The BHP shall perform the research necessary to enable the 
development and validation of the Fitness for Duty Behavioral Health 
and Cognition standard. 
4.1.10 The BHP shall perform the research necessary to enable the 
development of the Circadian Entrainment and Workload sections of 
NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human Systems Standard, Vol. 2. 
4.1.11 The SR shall perform the research necessary to enable development 
and validation of the Space Permissible Exposure Limit for Space Flight 
Radiation Exposure standard. 
4.1.12 The SR shall perform the research and technology developments 
necessary to enable the development of the Radiation sections of 
NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human Systems Standard, Vol. 2. 
4.1.13 The SHFH shall perform the research necessary to enable development 
and validation of the Permissible Exposure Limit Lunar Dust Inhalation 
standard. 
4.1.14 The ExMC shall perform the research necessary to enable development 
and validation of Crewmember Selection and Retention Criteria.  
4.1.15 The SHFH shall perform the research and technology developments to 
enable documentation and validation of the environmental and human 
factors standards within NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human Systems 
Standard, Vol. 2 and the Human Integration Design Handbook. 
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5. HRP REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO HUMAN HEALTH & 
PERFORMANCE RISKS 
The primary objective of the HRP is to enable prevention and mitigation of 
human health and performance risks to facilitate successful completion of 
exploration missions, and preservation of astronaut health over the long-term.  
Evidence Base 
The HRP Evidence Base is a collection of evidence-based risk reports, one for 
each human health and performance risk listed in this section and for which 
implementation activities are listed in HRP-47065, HRP Integrated Research 
Plan. The Evidence Base provides a current record of the state of knowledge, 
from research and operations, for each of the risks, written for the scientifically 
educated, non-specialist reader. The risk reports are posted on the Human 
Research Roadmap Website - 
http://humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/evidence/. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the development of HRP content has been formulated 
around the management architecture of: 
 
Figure 1: HRP Management Architecture 
Evidence of spaceflight-related issues is used to define risks to crew health and 
performance. The risks are due to gaps in our knowledgebase. HRP funds tasks 
to address and close these gaps, and provides deliverables to NASA programs 
to address identified issues. 
Human System Risk Board 
The CHMO is the Health & Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) per NPD 
1000.3D, The NASA Organization. The CHMO appoints the HMTA Chief Medical 
Officer (CMO) designee at each NASA center (as appropriate). The JSC CMO 
established the Human System Risk Board (HSRB) to ensure a consistent, 
integrated process is established and maintained for managing human system 
risks. 
Per HRP-47051A, HRP Program Plan, the Bioastronautics Roadmap (BR) was 
used as a starting-point reference document. The BR initially captured the human 
system risks associated with exploration missions. However, it did not capture 
the level of detail necessary to prioritize across disciplines or compare strategies 
for a given risk across mission architectures and resources. The JSC CMO 
developed the Risk Management Analysis Tool (RMAT) to fill this gap and 
facilitate discussion and decisions by the HSRB.   
The RMAT is used as a communication tool to understand human system risks 
and compare standards, requirements, mitigation strategies, etc. against known 
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mission architectures and resources. The RMAT collects the appropriate 
information to allow decision-makers to develop mitigation strategies for the 
highest priority human risks for each mission architecture. The RMAT format 
reviews human system risks in terms of consequence, likelihood, uncertainty, 
contributing factors, and proposals for mitigating the risks and reviews each risk 
in terms of multiple mission architectures (ISS 6-month mission, ISS 12-month 
mission, Lunar sortie, Lunar outpost, Asteroid and Mars Mission).  
If the HSRB determines there is sufficient evidence for a risk but additional 
research is required to understand or mitigate the risk, it is assigned to the 
applicable Program or individual responsible for owning the risk. If assigned to 
the HRP, the program will complete an analysis of the risk and develop a 
research plan to further understand the risk, inform the standards, or develop 
mitigation or monitoring strategies for the risk. The process for changing human 
health and performance risks is documented in HRP-47069B, Human Research 
Program Unique Processes, Criteria, and Guidelines (UPCG) document. 
Risks in the HRP Portfolio 
The table in this section lists the current HRP human health and performance 
risks and applicable HRP Element assignment. Risk content in the table contains 
the following information: 
1. Risk Title: Top level wording used to describe the risk. 
2. Risk Short Title: An abbreviation of the Risk Title 
3. Risk Statement:  Written to reflect that - Given the [CONDITION], there is 
a possibility that [CONSEQUENCE] will occur. 
4. Risk Context: Written to capture the what, when, where, how, and why of 
the risk by describing the adverse outcome/event that is to be avoided, the 
circumstances, contributing factors, and related issues (elaborate on the 
risk statement). 
5. RMAT Verification Status: Has the risk been Verified or substantiated by 
strong evidence either from spaceflight incidents, spaceflight or terrestrial 
data? If the risk is a concern that cannot be supported or refuted by 
available information, and for which further evidence to substantiate the 
risk is required, the risk is Unverified
6. Risk Criticality: Further described below. 
. 
 
Criticality Metric  
The HRP utilizes a criticality metric that serves as one of several inputs in the 
HRP Program Manager’s decision to allocate program resources to determine 
the priority of each risk.   
The criticality metric is based on the level of the current state of knowledge about 
a risk, whether existing standards are met, and the degree to which the level of 
understanding of the risk will prompt the HRP Program Manager to recommend, 
in a forum such as the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), “no-go” for 
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undertaking a mission. Each risk has a separate criticality rating for three mission 
scenarios: a Lunar Outpost mission (180-days), a Near Earth Asteroid (NEA) 
mission (1-year), and a Mars mission (3-years). The criticality rating has four 
possible values: Unacceptable, Acceptable, Controlled and Insufficient Data. The 
four ratings are described in detail below.  
 
A risk is deemed to have a rating of Unacceptable if one or more of its attributes 
(i.e. consequence, likelihood, uncertainty) are well understood and characterized 
such that it will not meet existing standards making it necessary to  reduce one 
or more of these attributes prior to a mission.  
Rating Level: Unacceptable (U) - Red 
 
– The current state of data and information on the risk and its mitigation and 
countermeasures would likely cause the HRP Program Manager to recommend, 
in a forum such as the HSRB, delaying a mission even if all other elements of the 
mission were ready (e.g. launch systems, Extravehicular Activity (EVA) systems, 
landing and life support systems).  
Context:  
– The lack of additional data and/or mitigation would leave NASA with too high of 
a risk.  
 
A risk is deemed to have a rating of Acceptable if one or more of its attributes 
(i.e. consequence, likelihood, uncertainty) is well understood and characterized 
such that it meets existing standards 
Rating Level: Acceptable (A) - Yellow 
but is not fully controlled
 
. This requires an 
acceptance of the risk and makes it important but not necessary to reduce one 
or more of its attributes prior to a mission, but the risk is not expected to preclude 
a mission.  
– The current state of data and information on the risk and its mitigation and 
countermeasures would likely 
Context:  
not
 
 cause the HRP Program Manager to 
recommend, in a forum such as the HSRB, delaying a mission. However, 
additional work could further reduce the risk’s consequence, likelihood or 
uncertainty (to the Controlled category).  
A risk is deemed to have a rating of Controlled if one or more of its attributes 
(i.e. consequence, likelihood, uncertainty) are well understood and characterized, 
and mitigation exists to control it at an accepted cost.  It is still helpful but not 
necessary to reduce one or more of these attributes prior to a mission even if 
the risk will not preclude a mission. 
Rating Level: Controlled (C) - Green  
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Context:  
– The current state of data and information on the risk and its mitigation and 
countermeasures would not cause the HRP Program Manager to recommend, in 
a forum such as the HSRB, delaying a mission. However, additional work could 
(a) further reduce the risk’s consequence, likelihood or uncertainty; or (b) 
increase engineering or operational efficiencies.  
 
Rating Level: Insufficient Data (I) - Gray  
A risk is deemed to have a rating of Insufficient Data if one or more of its 
attributes (i.e. consequence, likelihood, uncertainty) are poorly understood and 
inadequately characterized to assess whether it has the potential to preclude any 
mission, and standards do not exist.  
 
Context:  
– The current state of data and information on the risk and its mitigation and 
countermeasures is grossly inadequate to offer the HRP Program Manager any 
recommendations regarding the impact of the risk to a mission. Additional work is 
expected to reduce the risk’s uncertainty and offer more information to support a 
recommendation.  
 
The criticality of a risk alone is not sufficient to determine the priority of the risk. 
Priority is dependent on criticality as well as other factors such as limited 
availability of certain necessary resources (as in the ISS), exceptionally long lead 
times (needed to improve understanding and mitigation of radiation risks), or the 
amount of risk reduction that can be obtained with a specific set of resources. 
The level of activity (or budget) and timing of research investments reflect the 
final prioritization of the risks. 
Some risks listed below are identified as ‘Pending HSRB RMAT Approval’ and 
thus do not adhere to the categories described above. Although most risk 
wording is a reflection of approved RMATs, there may be instances when the 
HRP makes a decision to use revised or alternate risk wording. In such cases, 
the risk will contain a reference to its HSRB approved RMAT. 
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Table 3 – Exploration Missions Human Health and Performance Risks, Evidence Verification, and Mission Criticality 
HRP 
Element Risk Title, Short Title, Statement and Context  
Evidence 
Verification 
Status 
Criticality 
Lunar NEA Mars 
HHC Risk of Orthostatic Intolerance During Re-Exposure to Gravity (Short Title: OI) 
 
Statement: 
Given that there is cardiovascular adaptation during exposure to microgravity, there is a possibility 
that crewmembers will suffer from post-flight orthostatic intolerance upon re-exposure to gravity. 
 
Context: 
Post-flight orthostatic intolerance, the inability to maintain blood pressure while in an upright 
position, is an established, space-related medical problem. Orthostatic intolerance has been 
shown to progress to presyncope (inability to maintain standing blood pressure) in up to 80% of 
returning crewmembers tested with a post-flight tilt test. The greatest impact would occur on off-
nominal landings, especially for Soyuz and Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) returns or when 
landing on other planetary bodies where there will not be ground support personnel available. 
Countermeasures have been successfully identified and implemented (fluid loading, re-entry 
compression garments) or being evaluated (midodrine, post-flight compression garments, etc.). 
Completion of these efforts will be useful in determining what preventive measures should be 
used to combat orthostatic intolerance during future mission profiles. 
Verified C A A 
HHC Risk of Early Onset Osteoporosis Due to Spaceflight (Short Title: Osteo) 
 
Statement: 
Given some parameters of skeletal adaptation may not be reversible after return to earth, there is 
the possibility that an early onset of osteoporosis may occur. 
 
Context: 
Osteoporosis is a skeletal syndrome that is characterized by low bone mass and severe structural 
deterioration. This condition can be due to aging or an extrinsic factor(s). Spaceflight-induced 
bone loss is classified as the latter (Secondary Osteoporosis) and is not contingent upon age. 
Bone mineral loss occurs in microgravity due to unloading of the skeletal system, with average 
Unverified C A A 
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Table 3 – Exploration Missions Human Health and Performance Risks, Evidence Verification, and Mission Criticality 
HRP 
Element Risk Title, Short Title, Statement and Context  
Evidence 
Verification 
Status 
Criticality 
Lunar NEA Mars 
loss rates of approximately 1% per month. It is unclear whether this bone mineral density will 
stabilize at a lower level, or continue to diminish. It is unknown if fractional gravity, present on the 
moon and Mars, would mitigate the loss. Likewise, the impact of multiple long-duration missions 
or of cumulative time in space is not yet established. Space exposure could be a risk factor for 
long-term health implication of bone mineral loss that could put crewmembers at greater risk of 
fractures at an earlier age than expected for a terrestrial peer group and as opposed to traumatic 
fractures that are a result of excessive loading of bone (the biomechanical interaction between 
bone strength and the applied force vector (magnitude and direction of load)). Greater 
understanding of the mechanisms for bone atrophy in microgravity, and for recovery after return, 
is necessary to frame this risk, as well as to understand how current and future osteoporosis 
treatments may be employed. 
HHC Risk Factor of Inadequate Nutrition (Short Title: Nutrition) 
 
Statement: 
Given that adequate nutrition is a key factor in all physiological functions, that space flight has 
been shown to alter many physiological functions in humans, and that countermeasures for 
individual systems may alter nutritional status, there is a possibility that inadequate nutrition will 
compromise crew health, including endurance, muscle mass and strength, immune function, bone 
mass and strength, cardiovascular performance, gastrointestinal function, endocrine function, and 
ocular, psychological and physical health, and ability to mitigate oxidative damage. 
 
Context: 
In general, nutritional risks increase with duration of exposure to a closed (or semi-closed) food 
system and when countermeasures are employed. Understanding nutrient requirements in micro- 
or partial gravity environments and the effect of countermeasures on nutrient requirements is 
critical to ensure crew health and safety and mission success. Provision of these nutrients in safe 
amounts (neither high nor low) depends on provision of appropriate, palatable, foods with the 
stability of nutrients for the duration of the mission, and actual intake of the nutrients, and 
knowledge that countermeasures are not altering requirements. 
Verified C A U 
HHC Risk of Compromised EVA Performance and Crew Health Due to Inadequate EVA Suit Systems 
(Short Title: EVA) - Pending HSRB RMAT Approval 
No Status A A A 
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Table 3 – Exploration Missions Human Health and Performance Risks, Evidence Verification, and Mission Criticality 
HRP 
Element Risk Title, Short Title, Statement and Context  
Evidence 
Verification 
Status 
Criticality 
Lunar NEA Mars 
 
Statement: 
Improperly designed Extravehicular Activity (EVA) suits can result in the inability of the crew to 
perform as expected, and can cause mechanical and decompression injury. Suit developers must 
fully understand the impact of the suit design on crew performance and health to ensure properly 
designed mobility, pressures, nutrition, life support, etc. 
HHC Risk of Impaired Performance Due to Reduced Muscle Mass, Strength and Endurance (Short 
Title: Muscle) 
 
Statement: 
Given that skeletal muscles undergo reduced mass, strength, and endurance in-flight, there is a 
possibility the crew will be physically unable to perform mission tasks. 
 
Context: 
There is a growing body of research evidence which suggests that skeletal muscles, particularly 
postural muscles of the lower limb, undergo atrophy and structural and metabolic alterations 
during spaceflight. However, the relationships between in-flight exercise, muscle changes and 
performance levels are not well understood. Efforts should be made to try to understand the 
current status of in-flight and post-flight exercise performance capability and what the goals/target 
areas for protection are needed for the in-flight exercise program. 
Verified A A U 
HHC Risk of Renal Stone Formation (Short Title: Renal) 
 
Statement: 
Given changes in urinary biochemistry during space flight, there is a possibility that symptomatic 
renal stones may form, resulting in urinary calculi or urolithiasis, renal colic (pain), nausea, 
vomiting, hematuria, infection, and hydronephrosis. 
 
Verified C C C 
HRP-47052 
Revision E 
17 
 
Table 3 – Exploration Missions Human Health and Performance Risks, Evidence Verification, and Mission Criticality 
HRP 
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Context: 
Kidney stone formation and passage has the potential to greatly impact mission success and 
crewmember health for long-duration missions. Alterations in hydration state (relative dehydration) 
and bone metabolism (increased calcium excretion) during space travel may increase the risk of 
kidney stone formation, and it is unclear which mitigation strategy would be the most effective in 
the context of mission operations. 
HHC Risk of Bone Fracture (Short Title: Fracture) 
 
Statement: 
Given that crewmembers may experience high impact forces and/or decrease in bone strength, 
there is the possibility that fracture may occur. 
 
Context: 
The Factor of Risk (FOR) for fracture (“Risk of Bone Fracture”) is defined as the ratio between the 
Applied Force vector to bone and the Fracture Load of bone (vector is used here to indicate that 
both magnitude and direction of load are critical). Bone fracture load is a reflection of bone 
strength, but bone fracture load cannot be measured directly without being destructive. A long-
established surrogate measure for whole bone strength has been the DXA measurement of areal 
bone mineral density (aBMD). By this measure, skeletal adaptation to microgravity in long-
duration (LD) astronauts has been characterized by a ~ 1-2% decline in aBMD per month for 
normally weight-bearing bones. This rate is an average monthly BMD loss that has been 
determined over LD missions of 4-6 month duration. This level of BMD loss does not create an 
unacceptable risk of fractures during ISS missions since the Applied Loads are also reduced in 
the weightlessness of low Earth orbit. It is unclear whether DXA BMD loss will stabilize at a lower 
level or continue to diminish beyond 6 months. Thus, the total loss in BMD could be greater with 
longer missions, and consequently longer missions could increase the FOR. It is also unknown if 
fractional gravity, present on the moon and Mars, would mitigate the loss. Taken together, it is 
possible for astronauts, after 6 months of deconditioning, to have an increased FOR for at least 
one skeletal site in an environment with reduced g forces. The FOR for a given mission 
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architecture cannot be accurately estimated until the time course of skeletal adaptations (which 
influences bone strength) and the knowledge of mission activities (which influence applied loads) 
are identified. With this knowledge, the probabilities of bone overloading during the missions can 
be assessed. The types of fracture addressed in this risk are those that occur in-mission as 
opposed to fractures that occur at an earlier age post-flight resulting from osteoporosis due to 
spaceflight-induced bone loss. Greater understanding of skeletal adaptation to microgravity is 
necessary to frame this risk, as well as to understand how countermeasures to reduce FOR may 
be employed. 
HHC Risk of Intervertebral Disc Damage (Short Title: IVD) 
 
Statement: 
Given the morphological and possible biochemical changes in the intervertebral disc (IVD) during 
mechanical unloading in space, there is the possibility of IVD damage. 
 
Context: 
Lengthening of the spine in microgravity has been shown to occur during exposure to microgravity 
(and possibly fractional gravity) and may lead to IVD damage or any detrimental change to the 
IVD such as protrusion, herniation, degeneration, or tear (more research is required to determine 
whether biochemical changes occur). Muscle weakness, muscle atrophy, and postural 
disturbances associated with exposure to microgravity may also be contributors. There has been 
a relatively high occurrence rate of herniated IVD (5.34 events per 1,000 person-yrs) observed in 
astronauts post-flight. Although there appears to be a correlation between IVD damage and 
spaceflight, a causal relationship has yet to be definitively established. 
Unverified C I I 
HHC Risk of Cardiac Rhythm Problems (Short Title: Arrhythmia) - Pending HSRB RMAT Approval 
 
Statement: 
Given the condition of microgravity, there is a possibility that cardiac rhythm disturbances may 
Unverified C I i 
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occur. 
 
Context: 
Heart rhythm disturbances have been seen among astronauts. Some of these have been related 
to cardiovascular disease, but it is not clear whether this was due to pre-existing conditions or 
effects of spaceflight. It is hoped that advanced screening for coronary disease has greatly 
mitigated this risk. Other heart rhythm problems, such as atrial fibrillation, can develop over time, 
necessitating periodic screening of crewmembers’ heart rhythms. Beyond these terrestrial heart 
risks, some concern exists that prolonged exposure to microgravity may lead to heart rhythm 
disturbances. 
HHC Risk of Reduced Physical Performance Capabilities Due to Reduced Aerobic Capacity (Short 
Title: Aerobic) 
 
Statement: 
Given the condition of reduced aerobic capacity as measured by VO2 max, there is a possibility of 
reduced physical performance. 
 
Context: 
Astronauts’ physical performance during a mission, including activity in microgravity and fractional 
gravity, is critical to mission success. Setting minimum fitness standards and measuring whether 
crew can maintain these standards will document the effectiveness of maintenance regimens. 
Verified A A U 
HHC Risk of Crew Adverse Health Event Due to Altered Immune Response (Short Title: Immune) 
 
Statement: 
Given that the spaceflight environment results in an alteration of the immune system and 
reactivation of latent herpes viruses, there is a possibility that the crew will experience certain 
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disease states, including persistent latent viral reactivation, during exploration class missions. 
 
Context: 
Human immune function is altered in- and post-flight, but it is unclear if this change leads to an 
increased susceptibility to disease. Reactivation of latent viruses has been documented in 
crewmembers, though this reactivation has not been directly correlated with the immune changes 
and is usually asymptomatic. 
HHC Risk of Impaired Control of Spacecraft, Associated Systems and Immediate Vehicle Egress due to 
Vestibular / Sensorimotor Alterations Associated with Space Flight (Short Title: Sensorimotor) 
 
Statement: 
Given that there is an alteration in vestibular/sensorimotor function during and immediately 
following gravitational transitions manifested as changes in eye-head-hand control, postural 
and/or locomotor ability, gaze function, and perception, there is a possibility that crew will 
experience impaired control of the spacecraft during landing along with impaired ability to 
immediately egress following a landing on a planetary surface (Earth or other) after long-duration 
spaceflight. 
 
Context: 
It has been shown that long-duration spaceflight alters vestibular/sensorimotor function which is 
manifested in some, but not all crewmembers (some have only partial symptoms while other show 
all) as changes in postural and locomotor control, gaze control, degradation of dynamic visual 
acuity, and perceptual changes.  
 
These changes have not specifically been correlated with real time performance decrements. The 
possible alterations in sensorimotor performance are of interest for Mars missions, performance 
onboard the ISS and return to Earth from the ISS, flights to and from the ISS, Lunar Sorties, and 
Lunar Outpost missions with prolonged exposure to Lunar gravitational fields. This risk must be 
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better documented, and vestibular/sensorimotor changes must be better correlated with 
performance issues.  
 
Overall, this risk is supported by three factors: 
• Impaired Manual Control 
• Space Motion Sickness (SMS) and Gravitational Transition Motion Sickness 
• Impaired Vehicular Egress (particularly under adverse environmental conditions) 
HHC Risk of Therapeutic Failure Due to Ineffectiveness of Medication (Short Title: Pharm) - Pending 
HSRB RMAT Approval 
 
Statement: 
Based on subjective reports, drugs are effective during spaceflight. Better recordkeeping of 
medication use, efficacy, and side effects will be instituted, and those records will provide 
evidence for or against this risk. If medications are found to be ineffective, research will be 
performed to determine if drug metabolism is affected by spaceflight. Studies to determine if 
spaceflight affects drug stability are currently underway. 
No Status C C I 
HHC Risk of Microgravity-Induced Visual Impairment/Intracranial Pressure (Short Title: VIIP) - Pending 
HSRB RMAT Approval 
 
Statement: 
Given that all astronauts are exposed to microgravity and cephalad fluid shift, and given that both 
symptomatic and asymptomatic patients have both exhibited optic nerve sheath edema on MRI, 
there is a high probability that all astronauts have idiopathic intracranial hypertension to some 
degree, and that those susceptible (via eye architecture, anatomy, narrow disc) have a high 
likelihood of developing either choroidal folds or papilledema, and that the degree of that edema 
will determine long-term or permanent vision loss, sequelae, or impairment. 
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Context: 
Some crewmembers on long duration ISS missions experienced ophthalmic anatomical changes 
and visual performance decrements of varying degrees which were temporary in some cases and 
permanent in others. Additionally, future implications for asymptomatic crewmembers that 
demonstrated anatomical changes via MRI are unknown. It is unknown if exposure to partial 
gravity will be protective. 
 
Visual acuity changes and visual field defects occur at a rate much higher than expected in 
spaceflight crews. Observed physical findings in long-duration crewmembers include papilledema, 
choroidal folds, increased optic nerve sheath diameter, and a posterior flattened globe. Persistent 
increased post-flight intracranial pressure (ICP) has been inferred in several cases, consistent 
with a root cause of intracranial hypertension (IHT) possibly secondary to microgravity-induced 
fluid shifts. The mechanisms that cause IHT in microgravity are not known, and the processes by 
which eye damage occurs as a result of IHT are not understood. Decreased visual acuity, IHT, 
and other findings are present months and in some cases years after return, indicating that 
damage may be permanent. Acuity changes have been noted in short-duration crewmembers, 
indicating that the process starts early in spaceflight, although this group has not been closely 
examined. It is unknown if fractional gravity would mitigate the hazard, but its persistence after 
return to Earth suggests not. Likewise, the impact of multiple missions or of cumulative time in 
space is not yet established. Greater understanding of the mechanisms for eye damage and IHT 
is necessary to understand and mitigate the hazard and treat the resultant conditions. 
HHC Risk of Injury from Dynamic Loads (Short Title: Occupant Protection)  
 
Statement: 
Given the range of anticipated dynamic loads transferred to the crew via the vehicle, there is a 
possibility of loss of crew or crew injury during launch, abort, and landing. 
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Context: 
With the retirement of the Shuttle, future spacecraft systems may include launch-abort systems 
and parachute-assisted, capsule landings. Because of these design features, dynamic loads 
transmitted to the human may result in higher forces than currently experienced during 
spaceflight. The current standards and requirements do not adequately document the acceptable 
limits of forces and/or direction of force vectors which can be transmitted to the human without 
causing injury. Injuries may impair or prevent a crew-member from unassisted evacuation of the 
spaceflight vehicle after landing. Development of Agency-level human health and performance 
standards appropriate to occupant protection from dynamic loads as well as development of the 
method(s) of meeting those standards in the design, development, and operation of mission 
systems would reduce the likelihood of this risk so that crew injury or Loss of Crew (LOC) may be 
avoided or reduced. In addition, the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report cited inadequate 
upper body restraint and protection as a potential lethal event and recommended that future 
spacecraft suits and seat restraints should use state-of-the-art technology in an integrated solution 
to minimize crew injury and maximize crew survival in off-nominal acceleration environments (L2-
4/L3-4) and should incorporate conformal helmets and neck restraint designs similar to those 
used in professional auto racing (L2-7). 
SHFH Risk of Performance Decrement and Crew Illness Due to an Inadequate Food System (Short Title: 
Food) 
 
Statement: 
Given there is a constrained spaceflight environment with limited-source food supply, there is a 
possibility of performance decrement, illness, or loss of mission (LOM) due to an inadequate food 
system. 
 
Context: 
Food must be free from microbiological, chemical, and foreign matter contamination for up to five 
years of storage to provide a viable food system for the extended duration space missions. 
Inefficient sanitation, recordkeeping, processes, facilities, and many other factors could cause 
contamination compromising crew health or survival. 
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Nutrition is essential for the crew by providing nutrients and energy through calories. Adequate 
nutritional content of the food for up to five years will ensure crew performance and protects the 
body from deficiencies that may cause disease. 
 
Food acceptability, using sensory analysis, measures texture, appearance, flavor, aroma, and 
temperature of a food item. Acceptable food for up to five years encourages consumption and 
boosts crew morale by alleviating boredom and stress, and promotes unity amongst the crew 
during meal time.  
 
Inefficient use of resources such as mass, volume, power, crew time, and waste disposal capacity 
affect mission success. All of these elements influence the safety and quality of flight. 
SHFH Risk of Inadequate Human-Computer Interaction (Short Title: HCI) - Pending HSRB RMAT 
Approval 
 
Statement: 
Given that human-computer interaction and information architecture designs must support crew 
tasks, and given the greater dependence on HCI in the context of long-duration spaceflight 
operations, there is a risk that critical information systems will not support crew tasks effectively, 
resulting in flight and ground crew errors and inefficiencies, failed mission and program objectives, 
and an increase in crew injuries. 
  
Context: 
Information is presented most effectively when the user’s interests, needs, and knowledge are 
considered. If information displays are not designed with a fully developed operations concept, 
fine-grained task analysis, and knowledge of human information processing capabilities and 
limitations, the format, mode, and layout of the information may not optimally support task 
performance. This may result in users misinterpreting, overlooking, or ignoring the original intent 
of the information, leading to task completion times that impact the timeline, necessitating costly 
re-planning and rescheduling, and/or task execution errors, which endanger mission goals, crew 
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safety, and mission success. 
 
SHFH Risk of Performance Errors Due to Training Deficiencies (Short Title: Train) - Pending HSRB 
RMAT Approval 
 
Statement: 
Given that training content, timing, intervals, and delivery methods must support crew task 
performance, and given that training paradigms will be different for long-duration missions with 
increased crew autonomy, there is a risk that operators will lack the skills or knowledge necessary 
to complete critical tasks, resulting in flight and ground crew errors and inefficiencies, failed 
mission and program objectives, and an increase in crew injuries. 
  
Context: 
Historically, spaceflight operations have mitigated procedure execution errors in at least two ways: 
specially-trained crew members are assigned to missions and/or rotated into the operational 
environment when complex, mission-critical tasks must be performed; and, execution of such 
procedures is closely monitored and supported by flight controllers on the ground who have 
access to a broader and deeper pool of information and expertise than any individual operator. 
 
However, emerging mission architectures include long-duration operations in deep space. Such 
operations do not allow for assignment of new crew or rotation of crew to ground for training. 
Further, delays in communication will have a disruptive effect on the ability of earth-based flight 
controllers to monitor and support space operations in real time. As a result, it is necessary to 
develop an understanding of how training can be tailored to better support long-duration deep 
space operations (incl. the extent to which materials, procedures, and schedules of training should 
be modified). 
Verified C C A 
SHFH Risk of Inadequate Design of Human and Automation/Robotic Integration (Short Title: HARI) - 
Pending HSRB RMAT Approval 
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Statement: 
Given that automation and robotics must seamlessly integrate with crew, and given the greater 
dependence on automation and robotics in the context of long-duration spaceflight operations, 
there is a risk that systems will be inadequately designed, resulting in flight and ground crew 
errors and inefficiencies, failed mission and program objectives, and an increase in crew injuries. 
  
Context: 
The scope of NASA's future missions will involve humans interacting with automated and robotic 
systems to accomplish mission goals. This will be the case for both near and deep-space 
exploration missions, as well as Near-Earth-Object and Planetary surface exploration. Varying 
classes of robotic systems (including dexterous, heavy-lift and mobility systems) will be employed 
for these missions. Automation will be an integral part of ground and flight systems, in addition to 
being utilized within Robotic systems. The level of complexity of the operations required to carry 
out NASA's vision will greatly increase over the paradigm of robotics and automation in use today. 
Human and Robot teaming will be at the cornerstone of such operations. Systems will have to be 
designed to support multiple operators, varying time delays and increasing reliance on 
automation. In addition, robotic systems and their human interfaces must be designed to support 
all levels of human operation (direct manual control, teleoperation shared control, and supervisory 
control), while also supporting multiple robot operators in multi-agent team configurations, with 
those operators separated by time, space or both. Similarly, the integration of automation systems 
with their human users requires supporting a variety of role divisions: authority and autonomy can 
be differently allocated between human and automation, and the allocation may change 
dynamically depending on task or context. 
SHFH Risk of Poor Critical Task Design (Short Title: Task) - Pending HSRB RMAT Approval 
 
Statement: 
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Given that tasks, schedules, and procedures must accommodate human capabilities and 
limitations, and given that long-duration crews will experience physical and cognitive changes and 
increased autonomy, there is a risk that tasks, schedules, and procedures will be developed 
without considering the human condition, resulting in increased workload, flight and ground crew 
errors and inefficiencies, failed mission and program objectives, and an increase in crew injuries. 
  
Context: 
The risk of poor task design relates to the definition and development of mission tasks, task flows, 
schedules, and procedures. Operations tempo is driven by the scheduling of mission tasks, and 
can affect workload and situation awareness of crewmembers. Low workload levels have been 
associated with boredom and decreased attention to task; whereas high workload levels have 
been associated with increased error rates and the narrowing of attention to the possible 
detriment of tasks. Tasks are driven by procedures, and when written direction, checklists, graphic 
depictions, tables, charts or other published guidance is inadequate, misleading or inappropriate, 
an unsafe situation results. Guidelines for designing task flow, schedules, and procedures are 
critical for ensuring task and mission success. 
SHFH Risk of Adverse Health Effects of Exposure to Dust and Volatiles During Exploration of Celestial 
Bodies (Short Title: Dust) – Pending HSRB RMAT Approval 
 
Statement: 
Given the unique properties of lunar dust and volatiles on celestial bodies such as the moon, 
asteroids and Mars, minimal data on health effects of contact or airborne exposure, and the lack 
of a viable exposure standard, there is a possibility that exposure could lead to serious 
respiratory, cardiopulmonary, ocular, central nervous system, or dermal harm during lunar 
exploration-class missions, resulting in immediate or long-term health effects. 
 
Context: 
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Current lunar sortie and habitat operations include EVA activities, the collection of lunar rocks and 
soil, and possibly the use of this material in ‘in situ’ experiments. While the lunar design 
architecture is not finalized, current design suggests crew exposure to airborne lunar dust is highly 
likely.  
 
The nominal toxicity expected from ordinary mineral dust may be increased for lunar dust by the 
large and reactive surfaces of the dust grains. Human exposures to mineral dusts during industrial 
operations and from volcanic eruptions give us some sense of lunar dust toxicity, although the 
earth-based analogs have serious limitations. Animal and cellular studies provide further evidence 
that mineral dusts can be somewhat toxic. Earth-based research of mineral dust has shown that 
freshly fractured surfaces are reactive and elicit an increased toxic response. Since lunar dust is 
formed in space vacuum from highly energetic processes, we expect the grain surfaces to be 
reactive indefinitely until the dust is brought into a habitable environment.  
 
Lunar dust is characterized as fine, charged, and reactive dust capable of entering habitats and 
vehicle compartments where it can threaten crewmember health. Testing is critical for the 
determination of lunar dust toxicity in order to set a permissible exposure limit and risk criteria. 
Research areas should include characterization of lunar dust size distribution, grain morphology, 
chemical reactivity, the mode of activation and passivation of surfaces, toxicity to the respiratory 
system, ocular irritancy and abrasiveness, and cellular-level toxicity.  
 
Health effects from chronic exposure to lunar dust may lead to irreversible compromised 
pulmonary function and possible organ damage outside the lung through relocation of toxic nano-
scale particulates. Acute health effects include ocular irritation and abrasion that might impair 
crew vision, and dermal abrasion that might impair crew performance. 
 
Carbonaceous asteroids have an abundance of volatiles to which crews could be exposed. 
Martian dust is a major threat at the surface due to global dust storms and seasonal clusters of 
“dust devils” on the surface. Volatiles are also present at the surface. 
Asteroid and Martian dust have not been well characterized. 
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A subset of tests should be performed on “asteroid” dust obtained by grinding meteorites known to 
originate from asteroid material. 
Volatiles could pose a health risk during operations on carbonaceous asteroids and at the surface 
of Mars. This is especially true if industrial-scale operations are employed to extract volatiles for 
use in production of propellants. 
SHFH Risk of an Incompatible Vehicle/Habitat Design (Short Title: Hab) - Pending HSRB RMAT 
Approval 
 
Statement: 
Given that vehicle, habitat, and workspace designs must accommodate variations in human 
physical characteristics and capabilities, and given that the duration of crew habitation in these 
space-based environments will be far greater than missions of the past, there is a risk of acute 
and chronic ergonomic-related disorders, resulting in flight and ground crew errors and 
inefficiencies, failed mission and program objectives, and an increase in crew injuries. 
 
Context: 
This risk creates both short-term and long-term negative effects when a crewmember is engaged 
in performing a task due to problems with aspects of the designed physical working and living 
environment. Examples of short term effects include overexertion, difficulty in reading a checklist 
due to spacecraft vibrations or inadequate lighting, high temperatures in a module due to 
inadequate and excessive co-location of habitability related hardware and activities, difficulty 
donning a suit due to inadequate habitable volume, difficulties communicating with fellow 
crewmembers due to high levels of noise in the cabin, diminished mental capacity and discomfort 
due to high CO2 levels, or short-term disabilities caused by exposure to environmental 
contaminants. Inefficiencies may include unnecessary translations between workstations to 
complete tasks and increased task completion time due to difficulty in accessing equipment. 
Examples of the long term effects include ergonomic injuries / cumulative trauma disorders that 
are a result of repetitive motions, sustained maintenance of awkward postures, inadequate 
Verified C C A 
HRP-47052 
Revision E 
30 
 
Table 3 – Exploration Missions Human Health and Performance Risks, Evidence Verification, and Mission Criticality 
HRP 
Element Risk Title, Short Title, Statement and Context  
Evidence 
Verification 
Status 
Criticality 
Lunar NEA Mars 
workspace clearances resulting in frequent over-exertions, suit hardware requiring sustained 
performance at excessively high sub-maximal levels, and poorly designed work practices. 
Incompatible vehicle/habitat design could force crew members to hold these awkward postures for 
long periods of time. Interacting with a vehicle/habitat environment which unsatisfactorily 
accommodates the crew along all anthropometric ranges could also expose crew members to 
awkward postures and potential contact stress against soft tissue. Mismatched physical task 
requirements to actual crew‘s diminished physical capacity (decondition) could lead to the 
development of repetitive motion injuries, crew frustration, and/or mission failure. The physical 
well being of the returned crew will be compromised not only temporarily but also permanently as 
evidenced by the plight of manual laborers in industries with poorly designed ergonomic work 
conditions and practices. 
SHFH Risk of Adverse Health Effects Due to Alterations in Host-Microorganism Interactions (Short Title: 
Microhost) 
 
Statement: 
Given that flight experiment data indicates alterations in microbial virulence and astronaut immune 
function during spaceflight, the risk of infectious disease may be enhanced during spaceflight 
missions. 
 
Context: 
While hazard control systems and processes prevent the presence of many medically significant 
microorganisms during spaceflight missions, potentially pathogenic organisms could be carried by 
crewmembers, the spacecraft, and its cargo; thus, microbial infection of crewmembers cannot be 
completely prevented. Recent evidence from spaceflight experiments also suggests alterations in 
microbial characteristics, including virulence (disease causing potential), in organisms grown 
during flight. In combination with potential host susceptibility due to dysfunction in the immune 
system, infectious disease risk may be greater than in the spaceflight environment than in normal 
workplace settings. 
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ExMC Inability to Adequately Recognize or Treat an Ill or Injured Crew Member (Short Title: ExMC) 
 
Statement: 
Given that there are limited mass, volume, power, and crew training time available for space 
exploration missions which therefore limits the amount of equipment, consumables, and 
procedures available to treat medical problems, there is a possibility that certain medical 
conditions will not be treatable. 
 
Context: 
Mission architecture limits the amount of equipment, consumables, and procedures that will be 
available to treat medical problems. Mission allocation and technology development must be 
performed to ensure that the limited mass, volume, power, and crew training time are used 
efficiently to provide the broadest possible treatment capability. There is a risk that, given the 
resource limitations, some conditions may go untreated. 
Verified A A U 
BHP Risk of Adverse Behavioral Conditions and Psychiatric Disorders (Short Title: Bmed) - Reference 
RMATs for Risk of Adverse Behavioral Conditions, and Risk of Psychiatric Disorders  
 
Statement: 
Given the extended duration of future missions and the isolated, extreme and confined 
environments, there is a possibility that (a) adverse behavioral conditions will occur; and (b) 
mental disorders (DSM-IV –TR) could develop should adverse behavioral conditions be 
undetected and unmitigated. 
 
Context: 
This risk derives from the occurrence of environmental, social and physical conditions that may 
occur on a continuum. NASA BHP Ops defines an Adverse Behavioral Condition as: “Any 
decrement in mood, cognition, morale or interpersonal interaction that adversely affects 
operational readiness or performance.” Scientific studies demonstrate that if left unmitigated, 
personal reactions such as those listed below, can erode individual motivation, morale and 
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performance.   
• Worry/anxiety over conditions of mission or on Earth that distracts from mission focus 
• Anger/resentment toward others that affects cooperation during mission 
• Insufficient training (Pre, In or Post–Flight) 
• Depression/loneliness due to isolation from friends and family 
• Unhappiness over role or treatment by others that leads to social isolation during mission 
Acute or chronic conditions during spaceflight may also exacerbate the risk of developing a 
psychiatric disorder from these adverse behavioral conditions. The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders IV-TR (DSM-IV-TR), defines a mental disorder as: 
“A clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an 
individual and that is associated with present distress…or disability…or with a significantly 
increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom…” (pp.xxxi). 
BHP Risk of Performance Errors Due to Fatigue Resulting from Sleep Loss, Circadian 
Desynchronization, Extended Wakefulness, and Work Overload (Short Title: Sleep) 
 
Statement: 
Given that astronauts experience sleep loss, circadian desynchronization, work overload, and 
extended wakefulness, there is a possibility a performance decrement will occur, resulting in the 
crew functioning poorly. 
 
Context: 
Fatigue resulting from sleep loss, circadian desynchronization, extended wakefulness, and work 
overload occur to some extent for ground and flight crews, prior to and during spaceflight 
missions. Ground evidence indicates that fatigue, as experienced by ground and flight crews, may 
lead to performance errors, which could potentially compromise mission objectives, and 
consequently the mission itself. Efforts are needed to identify the environmental and mission 
conditions that interfere with sleep quality, as well as individual vulnerabilities to sleep loss and 
circadian desynchronization. Research areas to mitigate this risk may also include: development 
of a self-assessment tool for cognitive function and fatigue; light therapy for phase shifting, 
alertness, and mood disorders; individualized protocols for sleep-wake medication use; sleep 
Verified C C C 
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Table 3 – Exploration Missions Human Health and Performance Risks, Evidence Verification, and Mission Criticality 
HRP 
Element Risk Title, Short Title, Statement and Context  
Evidence 
Verification 
Status 
Criticality 
Lunar NEA Mars 
dose-response recovery curves and individualized models for countermeasure implementation 
and optimal work-rest schedules; and other evidence-based means to improve individual sleep 
quality and reduce fatigue. 
BHP Risk of Performance Decrements due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, 
and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team (Short Title: Team) 
 
Statement: 
Given that the conditions of long-duration missions will likely impact behavioral health and 
functioning of the team, performance decrements may occur that will jeopardize mission success 
and crew health and safety. 
 
Context: 
Human performance decrements may occur due to problems associated with working in the 
space environment and to the failure of the crews to cooperate and work effectively with each 
other and/or with flight controllers and other support staff. Interpersonal conflict, impaired 
communication, and inadequate teamwork behavior will impact performance and mission 
success. The history of spaceflight crews regarding important team dynamics including 
communication, cooperation, and coordination has not been systematically documented. Tools, 
training, and support methods should be provided to reduce the likelihood of this risk so that 
optimal crew performance may be realized for exploration missions. Current ISS mission 
operations for six month durations are sufficient; however, there are ways to improve and optimize 
current operations regarding teamwork. In addition, lunar missions, while planned for six month 
durations, will benefit from research addressing monitoring and methods for self-regulating teams 
living and working in isolated, confined environments. 
Verified C A A 
SR Risk of Radiation Carcinogenesis (Short Title: Cancer) 
 
Statement: 
Given that crewmembers are exposed to radiation from the space environment, there is a 
possibility for increased cancer morbidity or mortality. 
Verified A U U 
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Context: 
In space, astronauts are exposed to ionizing radiation that is quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from terrestrial radiation. This environment includes protons and high-Z high-energy 
(HZE) ions together with secondary radiation, including neutrons and recoil nuclei that are 
produced by nuclear reactions in spacecraft materials or tissue. Astronauts who are on missions 
to the ISS, the Moon or Mars are exposed to ionizing radiation with effective doses in the range of 
50 to 2000 mSv (milli-Sievert) projected for possible mission scenarios. Similar doses from 
terrestrial radiation sources, such as gamma-rays and X-rays, are associated with an increased 
risk for development of cancer. Therefore, occupational radiation exposure from the space 
environment may increase cancer morbidity or mortality risk in astronauts. 
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SR Risk of Acute Radiation Syndromes Due to Solar Particle Events (Short Title: ARS) 
 
Statement: 
Given the known occurrence of solar particle events (SPE) and the inability to predict when they 
might or might not occur, there is a possibility the crew will suffer from acute radiation sickness 
(ARS), prodromal effects, skin damage and potential hematological/immune changes resulting in 
LOM. 
 
Context: 
Radiation and synergistic effects of radiation may place the crew at significant risk for acute 
radiation sickness from a major solar event or artificial event, such that the mission or crew 
survival may be placed in jeopardy. Crew health and performance may be impacted by acute 
solar events. Beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), the protection of the Earth's magnetosphere is no 
longer available, such that increased shielding and protective mechanisms are necessary in order 
to prevent acute radiation sickness and impacts to mission success or crew survival. The primary 
data available at present are derived from analysis of medical patients and persons accidentally 
exposed to high doses of radiation. Data more specific to the spaceflight environment must be 
compiled to quantify the magnitude of increase of this risk and to develop appropriate protection 
strategies. 
Verified A A A 
SR Risk of Acute or Late Central Nervous System Effects from Radiation Exposure (Short Title: CNS)  
 
Statement: 
Given that the crew is exposed to radiation from the space environment, there is the possibility 
that they will have CNS damage leading to acute and/or late changes in motor function, behavior, 
or neurological disorders. 
 
Context: 
Possible acute and late risks to the central nervous system (CNS) from galactic cosmic rays 
Unverified A I I 
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(GCR) and solar particle events (SPE) are a documented concern for human exploration of space. 
Acute CNS risks include: altered cognitive function, reduced motor function, and behavioral 
changes, all of which may affect performance and human health. Late CNS risks include 
neurological disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease, dementia or premature aging. Although 
detrimental CNS changes are observed in humans treated with high dose radiation (e.g., gamma 
rays and protons) for cancer and are supported by experimental evidence showing neurocognitive 
and behavioral effects in animal models, the significance of these results on the morbidity to 
astronauts has not been elucidated. There is a lack of human epidemiology data on which to base 
CNS risk estimates and therefore risk projection based on scaling to human data, as done for 
cancer risk, is not possible for CNS risks. Research specific to the spaceflight environment using 
animal and cell models must be compiled to quantify the magnitude of this risk and to establish 
validity of the current PEL. In addition, the impact of radiation exposure in combination with 
individual sensitivity or other space flight factors, as well as assessment of the need for 
biological/pharmaceutical countermeasures will be considered after further definition of CNS risk 
occurs. 
SR Risk of Degenerative Tissue or other Health Effects from Radiation Exposure (Short Title: Degen) 
 
Statement: 
Given that the crew is exposed to radiation from the space environment there is the possibility that 
they will develop degenerative tissue diseases. 
 
Context: 
Degenerative diseases including cardiac, circulatory, and digestive diseases; and cataracts are 
documented following exposures to terrestrial sources of ionizing radiation (e.g., gamma rays and 
x-rays). This provides evidence for possible degenerative tissue effects following exposures to 
ionizing radiation in the form of galactic cosmic rays or solar particle events expected during long 
duration space travel, although the mechanisms and the magnitude of influence of radiation 
leading to these diseases are not well characterized Degenerative disease risks are difficult to 
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assess because multiple factors, including radiation, are believed to play a role in the etiology of 
the diseases. Data specific to the spaceflight environment must be compiled to quantify the 
magnitude of this risk, to decrease the uncertainty in current Permissible Exposure Limits (PEL), 
and to determine if additional protection strategies are required. 
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5.1 THE HRP SHALL QUANTIFY THE HUMAN HEALTH AND 
PERFORMANCE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 
FOR EXPLORATION MISSIONS. 
Rationale: In many cases, there is a large uncertainty associated with the 
risk due to lack of controlled spaceflight (or ground analog) experimental 
evidence. This HRP requirement is to quantifiably describe the likelihood 
and consequences of the risks. The uncertainties associated with these 
quantities should be narrowed to the target values identified by each 
standard or to the greatest extent practical to facilitate proper decisions for 
exploration hardware and software design and mission design. 
5.1.1 The HRP Science Management Office (SMO) shall develop ways to 
improve estimates of the integrated human health and performance risk 
associated with human spaceflight for exploration missions.  
Rationale: The overall risk assessment extends beyond a “list” of risks. 
The risks often have inter-relationships and interdependencies. The SMO 
must evaluate the risks to identify and quantify these inter-relationships 
and interdependencies, and provide an assessment of the total risk to the 
human system for spaceflight. This will help focus HRP efforts and ensure 
proper decision making. 
5.1.2 The BHP shall quantify the BHP-applicable Risks identified in Table 3. 
5.1.3 The ExMC shall quantify the ExMC-applicable Risks identified in Table 3. 
5.1.4 The HHC shall quantify the HHC-applicable Risks identified in Table 3. 
5.1.5 The SHFH shall quantify the SHFH-applicable Risks identified in Table 3. 
5.1.6 The SR shall quantify the Space Radiation-applicable Risks identified in 
Table 3. 
5.2 THE HRP ELEMENTS SHALL DEVELOP COUNTERMEASURES AND 
TECHNOLOGIES TO PREVENT OR MITIGATE ADVERSE OUTCOMES 
OF HUMAN HEALTH AND PERFORMANCE RISKS. 
Rationale: Each risk is written with respect to an adverse outcome. The 
intent of the HRP is to prevent the adverse outcome from occurring. If that 
cannot be done, the intent is to develop and validate novel 
countermeasures (devices, drugs, procedures, etc.) that will mitigate the 
adverse outcome. In this context, “mitigate” means “reduce the severity or 
reduce the probability of the adverse outcome.” 
5.2.1 The BHP shall develop countermeasures and technologies to prevent or 
mitigate adverse outcomes of human health and performance risks 
relevant to BHP (see Table 3). 
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5.2.2 The ExMC shall develop countermeasures and technologies to prevent or 
mitigate adverse outcomes of human health and performance risks 
relevant to ExMC (see Table 3). 
5.2.3 The HHC shall develop countermeasures and technologies to prevent or 
mitigate adverse outcomes of human health and performance risks 
relevant to HHC (see Table 3). 
5.2.4 The SHFH shall develop countermeasures and technologies to prevent or 
mitigate adverse outcomes of human health and performance risks 
relevant to SHFH (see Table 3). 
5.2.5 The SR shall develop countermeasures and technologies to prevent or 
mitigate adverse outcomes of human health and performance risks 
relevant to Space Radiation (see Table 3). 
5.3 THE HRP ELEMENTS SHALL DEVELOP COUNTERMEASURES AND 
TECHNOLOGIES TO MONITOR AND TREAT ADVERSE OUTCOMES 
OF HUMAN HEALTH AND PERFORMANCE RISKS. 
Rationale: If a risk cannot be mitigated adequately, the human must be 
monitored for indicators of an adverse outcome, and treatment and or 
countermeasures should be developed. 
5.3.1 The BHP shall develop countermeasures and technologies to monitor and 
treat adverse outcomes of human health and performance risks relevant 
to BHP (see Table 3). 
5.3.2 The ExMC shall develop countermeasures and technologies to monitor 
and treat adverse outcomes of human health and performance risks 
relevant to ExMC (see Table 3). 
5.3.3 The HHC shall develop countermeasures and technologies to monitor and 
treat adverse outcomes of human health and performance risks relevant 
to HHC (see Table 3). 
5.3.4 The SHFH shall develop countermeasures and technologies to monitor 
and treat adverse outcomes of human health and performance risks 
relevant to SHFH (see Table 3). 
5.3.5 The SR shall develop countermeasures and technologies to monitor 
indicators of adverse outcomes of human health and performance risks 
relevant to Space Radiation (see Table 3). 
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6. HRP REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO PROVISION OF ENABLING 
CAPABILITIES 
6.1 THE HRP SHALL PROVIDE THE ENABLING CAPABILITY TO 
FACILITATE HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION WITH RESPECT TO THE 
HUMAN SYSTEM. 
Rationale: Ensuring Human exploration requires some infrastructure or 
activities that do not readily fall into a specific research and technology 
development category. The requirements below are intended to provide 
NASA with the necessary infrastructure or capabilities to implement the 
research and technology work required to update, inform, and validate 
standards and to address the risks relevant to human exploration. 
In the course of research and technology development, each HRP 
Element may encounter the need to perform studies in a ground-based 
space analog environment [e.g., bed-rest facility, Antarctica, NASA 
Extreme Environment Mission Operation (NEEMO)]. Each Element is 
responsible for the selection and/or validation of the appropriate analogs 
and the necessary planning, integration, and execution. Large resource 
commitments to analog facilities must be reflected in the Element 
Research Plan so that the cost-benefit to the HRP is clear. 
6.1.1 The ISSMP shall plan, integrate, and execute HRP research tasks 
requiring access to space to address standards or reduce or eliminate 
human health and performance risks. 
Rationale: Access to space research platforms [the Space Transportation 
System (STS), the ISS, and all ISS visiting vehicles that transport crew 
and/or cargo to and from the ISS] is required to study and/or validate 
many of the items in sections 4.1 and 5.0. The ISSMP serves as the 
service to integrate, across all other HRP Elements, and optimize the 
research plans requiring access to space. The ISSMP provides the 
interface to the spaceflight programs to ensure that the research is 
properly planned, integrated, and executed with the required data returned 
to the investigator. 
6.1.2 The ExMC shall provide data integration and management function to 
ensure proper handling of and access to HRP data. 
Rationale: Access to data is critically important to advancing the state of 
knowledge of the human system in space. A data integration and 
management function includes the proper archiving of historical research 
data [e.g., The Life Sciences Data Archive (LSDA)] and organizing 
medical and research data to provide proper security levels, allow access 
by query, and to provide tools to allow analysis of evidence (e.g., 
Integrated Medical Model). 
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6.2 THE HRP SHALL ENSURE PRESERVATION AND MAINTENANCE OF 
CORE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY AND EXPERTISE IN HUMAN 
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT. 
Rationale: The core competencies are those which are necessary to 
maintain and nurture an understanding of the existing evidence base 
regarding risks and adverse outcomes to humans due to spaceflight. This 
core competency involves sustaining and maintaining a dedicated 
scientific and management workforce and a robust external scientific 
community. It also requires an adequate testing laboratory physical-plant 
capability. Preservation and maintenance of this capability is necessary to 
provide stability over the multi-decadal implementation of the vision for 
space exploration. This core competency is necessary to facilitate the 
following: 
Strategic planning.  Identification and prioritization of the risks to the 
human system and development of long-range plans to quantify, prevent, 
mitigate, and treat the adverse outcomes requires competency of both the 
internal and external community to ensure proper direction to the research 
community for focusing their effort.  
Acquisition development, planning, and execution. Acquisition of research 
and technology development is an inherently governmental function that 
requires core expertise within the civil service to ensure that the U.S. 
Government remains a “smart buyer” with respect to research and 
technology development for the human system. 
Operations support for near-real time and real-time operational decisions 
involving the human system and environment. Laboratory facilities and the 
expertise to run them and interpret results are necessary to support an 
ongoing evaluation of the human system response to the space 
environment and to support the medical operations function during a 
mission. This involves the internal community, and to some extent, the 
external community where uniquely specialized expertise must be sought. 
The requirement is written at the HRP level and not specifically allocated 
to the Program Elements. As part of the annual Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, Program Management will 
review the core technical capability of the Program Elements and adjust 
where appropriate. 
6.3 EACH HRP ELEMENT SHALL ENSURE THAT THEIR PROCESSES 
AND PRODUCTS COMPLY WITH THE NASA POLICY DIRECTIVES 
AND NASA PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS LISTED IN THE TABLE 
OF APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS IN SECTION 2.1. 
Rationale: The Table of applicable documents includes the NASA Policy 
Directives (NPD) and NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) specifically 
referenced by HRP 47051, HRP Program Plan. This requirement explicitly 
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states which NPR and NPD are applicable to the HRP and ensures that 
the requirement is flowed down to the Program Element level. 
Identification of specific NPR/NPD applicability falls upon each individual 
Element/Project when the Project Plan is defined. The intent of this 
requirement is to ensure HRP compliance with these documents within the 
normal processes and product development ongoing in the HRP. 
6.4 THE HRP ELEMENTS SHALL DEVELOP METHODS AND 
TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE HUMAN SYSTEMS RESOURCE 
REQUIREMENTS (MASS, VOLUME, POWER, DATA, ETC.). 
Rationale: Methods and technologies that reduce the medical systems 
requirements for mass, volume, power, data, etc. must be developed to 
reduce the overall Constellation Program resource requirements. Each 
HRP research element must focus the research on producing 
countermeasures and technologies that fit within the extremely limited 
resource envelopes anticipated for the exploration mission. An example is 
the reduction in time dedicated to exercise prescriptions. Present exercise 
prescriptions present a large burden on the overall mission timeline.  
6.4.1 The HHC shall develop methods and technologies to reduce human 
systems resource requirements (mass, volume, power, data, etc.). 
6.4.2 The BHP shall develop methods and technologies to reduce human 
systems resource requirements (mass, volume, power, data, etc.). 
6.4.3 The SR shall develop methods and technologies to reduce human 
systems resource requirements (mass, volume, power, data, etc.). 
6.4.4 The SHFH shall develop methods and technologies to reduce human 
systems resource requirements (mass, volume, power, data, etc.). 
6.4.5 The ExMC shall develop methods and technologies to reduce human 
systems resource requirements (mass, volume, power, data, etc.). 
 
 
HRP-47052 
Revision E 
43 
 
APPENDIX A  ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
aBMD Areal Bone Mineral Density 
ARS Acute Radiation Sickness 
 
BHP Behavioral Health & 
Performance 
BMD Bone Mineral Density 
 
CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CMO Chief Medical Officer 
CHMO Chief Health & Medical 
Officer 
CNS Central Nervous System 
 
DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid 
DSM Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders 
Degen Degenerative 
 
e.g. For Example 
ESMD Exploration Science Mission 
Directorate 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
ExMC Exploration Medical 
Capabilities 
 
Hab Habitat 
HARI Human & 
Automation/Robotic 
Integration 
HCI Human-Computer Interaction 
HEOMD Human Exploration and 
Operations Mission 
Directorate 
HHC Human Health 
Countermeasures 
HMTA Health & Medical Technical 
Authority 
HRP Human Research Program 
HRPCB Human Research Program 
Control Board 
 
ISS International Space Station 
ISSMP ISS Medical Project 
IVA Intravehicular Activity 
IVD Intervertebral Disc  
 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
 
L. Lunar 
LD Long Duration 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
LOM Loss Of Mission 
LSDA Life Sciences Data Archive 
 
Microhost Host-Microorganism 
 
NASA National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
NEEMO NASA Extreme Environment 
Mission Operation 
NP NASA Publication 
NPD NASA Procedural Directive 
NPR NASA Procedural 
Requirement 
NSPD National Security 
Presidential Directive 
 
OCHMO Office of the Chief Health 
and Medical Office 
OI Orthostatic Intolerance 
Osteo Osteoporosis 
 
PPBE Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution  
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PRD Program Requirements 
Document 
 
R&T Research and Technology 
RMAT Risk Mitigation Analysis Tool 
 
SHFH Space Human Factors & 
Habitability 
SLSD Space Life Sciences 
Directorate 
SMO Science Management Office 
SMS Space Motion Sickness 
SPE Solar Particle Event 
SR Space Radiation 
SSP Space Station Program 
STS Space Transportation 
System 
 
TBD To Be Determined 
 
U.S. United States 
UPCG Unique Processes, Criteria, 
and Guidelines 
 
VIIP Visual 
Impairment/Intracranial 
Pressure
 
